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Abstract 
 
Along with people’s profound recognition of the importance of wind power, countries 
are seeking for feasible and effective policy regimes or mechanisms to explore and 
develop wind power, and China is no exception. Therefore, Mandated Market Share 
(MMS) policy on promoting wind power is selected as the focus of this study. A 
welfare-maximizing model is first developed and is trying to represent a real power 
market, where the wind power and the coal-fired power are used simultaneously. And 
then, the welfare analysis is used to investigate the social optimization problems with 
and without MMS. Also, the policy is investigated in competition and monopoly 
market organizations to see which market organization is more efficient with MMS. 
Finally, through welfare analysis and the relevant discussion this study tells us why we 
need MMS policy on promoting wind power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROMOTING WIND POWER IN CHINA 
Welfare Analysis of Mandated Market Share (MMS) 
3
Acknowledgement  i 
Abstract  ii 
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………... 1 
2 Background …………………………………………………………………... 5 
2.1 Wind energy …………………………………………………………….. 5 
2.2 Wind power in the world …………………………………………………6 
2.3 Wind power in China ……………………………………………………..8 
3 The basic model .……………………………………………………………… 10 
3.1 Necessary hypotheses for setting the models …………………………… 10 
3.2 The objective function and constraints ………………………………….. 11 
4 Welfare comparison for the scenarios with or without MMS……....………17 
4.1 The first comparison ……………………………………………………. 17 
4.2 The second comparison …………………………………………………. 18 
4.2.1 The eight cases……………….............................................................18 
4.2.2 With a zero marginal cost on wind power……………………………30 
4.2.3 A brief summing up ……………………………………………… .. 32 
5 Market organization...…………………….………………………………….. 33 
5.1 Competition with MMS……………………….....................…………… 33 
5.2 Monopoly with MMS……………………………………………………. 35 
6 Discussion ……………………………………………………………………. 37 
6.1 Why MMS ……………………………………………………………… 37 
6.2 Recommendations for Inner Mongolia …………………………………..38 
6.2.1 Some facts in Inner Mongolia……..................................................... 39 
6.2.2 Recommendations…………………………………………………. 40 
7 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………… 42 
7.1 Summary ……………………………………………………………… 42 
7.2 Limitation and suggestions for further study……………………………..43 
Reference …………………………………………………...……………………... 45 
PROMOTING WIND POWER IN CHINA 
Welfare Analysis of Mandated Market Share (MMS) 
1
1 Introduction 
China is a country not only with a huge population but also with a fast growing economy. 
The fast growing economy causes a huge increase in the electricity consumption. 
According to Xinhua News Agency, with an economy growing at 9.8%, the overall 
electricity consumption in China goes up by 13.2% in 2005, leading to a severe problem of 
how the country powers its factories, businesses, and households for the coming decades. 
As we know, China’s power industry is mainly relying on coal-fired power. According to 
Zhang and Zhao (2006), electricity output in China reached 2474.7 billion kwh in 2005, 
within which, coal-fired electricity was 2018 billion kwh, accounting for 81.5%; 
hydropower 395.2 billion kwh, 16.0%; nuclear power 52.3, 2.1%; other resources such as 
wind, solar and tidal power 9.2 billion kwh, 0.4%.  
 
The traditional power choice – coal – however, causes significant environmental problems. 
The sulfur dioxide emission from burning coal is one of the direct causes of air pollution. 
Some research shows that 40,000 people in China die each year from air pollution (Yu, 
2005). As coal is non-renewable resource, once used up, they will take hundreds of 
millions of years to regenerate, which would result in resource depletion. The pollutants 
from the burning of coal would also cause acid rain and greenhouse effects (EEC, 2005). 
Chinese current power sector is under a double pressure from economic growth and 
environmental protection. Changing the energy sources structure of electricity 
consumption and seeking alternative energy sources therefore are definitely crucial for the 
development of China’s power industry.  
 
Being a clean and renewable resource, wind energy has received much attention recently 
as an alternative to meet the increasing demand of electricity and to relieve environmental 
problems at the same time. Compared to coal-fired power, wind power is the one in line 
with the principle of sustainable development. Wind power has two key advantages. One 
is that wind power generates no pollution so it does no harm to environment, public health, 
particularly air quality. The other is that wind comes from nature. We may say that on a 
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large scale it is unlimited in terms of supply. According to the estimation, if China 
develops one half of its exploitable wind potentialities, it could generate power about 275 
billion kwh each year, displacing the need for 135 million tons of coal and reducing 2 
million tons of sulfur dioxide and 70 million tons of carbon emission (Lew and Logan, 
2001); if China devotes all its efforts to the development of wind power, the intending 
production of wind power could be three times more than the current national demand of 
electricity (Mao, 2006).  
 
Currently, wind power, as new energy, has become a hot topic in the world. A number of 
researches on wind power were systematically discussed in literatures. (Gipe, 2004; Beith, 
et al., 2004; and Mathew, 2006), but most of them focused on technological aspects. 
However, in practice, energy strategies are not made merely on the basis of technical 
feasibilities. The economic aspect also plays an important role in making decisions. We 
found some text on economics of wind power in Mathew’s book (2006). He uses net 
present value (NPV) approach to explain how to make an investment decision from the 
perspective of enterprise. Of course, economic issues of wind power are multidimensional.  
 
Along with people’s profound recognition of the importance of wind power, a few 
countries have constructed relevant policy regimes or mechanisms to explore and develop 
wind power. It is generally known that policy regimes of wind power vary wildly across 
countries, but there are two fundamentally different policy regimes in the leading wind 
power countries. As mentioned in the Asia Alternative Energy Program’s working paper 
published by the World Bank (2000), one policy regime is that the government sets the 
price and the market determines the quantity (such as German Feed-in Law1); the other is 
that the government sets the quantity and the market determines the price (such as 
                                     
1 According to the World Bank, under an electricity feed-in-law, electric utilities are obligated to purchase 
any electricity generated with renewable resources at fixed, minimum prices. These prices are generally set 
higher than the regular market price, and payments are usually guaranteed over a specified period of time. 
(see http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTENERGY/EXTRETOOLKIT) 
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Mandate Market Share). A proper policy regime is indispensable. For example, Germany 
led the world with 18,428 MW and its good development of wind power should be 
somewhat attributed to a favorable policy regime, the so-called “Feed-in-Law” (GWEC, 
2006). 
 
In this study, I will mainly perform welfare analysis to investigate the development of 
wind power by introducing Mandate Market Share (MMS) policy. According to the World 
Bank, MMS policy mandates that a certain share or absolute quantity of electricity is 
supplied from renewable energy. In other words, the government sets a target and the 
market determines the price (see http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
TOPICS/EXTENERGY/EXTRETOOLKIT). I’m interested in MMS not only because it is 
a policy aiming at promoting the development of renewable energies which is in line with 
current China’s energy strategy of taking renewable energy as the first priority, but also 
because there are some relevant researches on MMS policy done in China (Ren, et al., 
2002; Zhang, 2003; Guo, 2003; Ren, 2005; and Xu, 2005). Unfortunately most of these 
researches are verbal. The key difference of this study from previous researches is that I 
would develop a welfare-maximizing model and try to represent a real power market (such 
as Inner Mongolian power market), where wind power and coal-fired power are used 
simultaneously.  
 
The information of policies and updated statistics, in this study, has been acquired mostly 
from the Internet because of its convenience. However, when using the electronic sources 
in social science study, attention should be paid to the origin of the website. Thus, only 
reliable websites of international media, governments, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and international institutions are selected as sources. 
 
The main text, in this study, starts in Chapter 2 where I provide some useful concepts and 
background knowledge of wind power. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 present the design of my study. 
The basic welfare-maximizing model is constructed in Chapter 3. The welfare analysis is 
performed to investigate the social optimization problems with and without MMS policy 
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in Chapter 4. Then MMS policy will be investigated in two different market organizations 
in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 is a brief discussion on why we choose MMS and the policy 
recommendations on promoting wind power for an example city, Inner Mongolia, which 
has similar power market with the modeled one. In Chapter 7, thesis finishes with the 
conclusion of what has been done and suggestions for future research. 
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2 Background 
“Environmental resources are described as renewable when they have a capacity for 
reproduction and growth” (Perman, et al., 2003). Fisheries, forests, water and atmospheric 
system can be descried as renewable stock resources. On the other hand, wind, solar, wave 
and geothermal energy belongs to renewable flow resources. Wind energy is clean 
renewable resource. Wind could produce wind power. Wind power is the conversion of 
wind energy usually through using wind turbines.  
 
2.1 Wind energy  
Wind energy is a kind of kinetic energy generated by moving air. The kinetic energy 
available is higher at a higher wind speed. Recently, wind energy is being widely known 
by people and developing fast, since it may produce less pollution and have little negative 
impact on environment (ECC, 2005). 
 
Wind power density 
A meteorological report (Xue, et al., 2001) provides the formula for calculating wind 
power, namely, wind power density, D , is as follows: 
3
2
1 vD ρ=   (2.1) 
Where ρ  is air density measured in 3/ mkg ; v  is wind speed measured in sm / . Due 
to the randomicity of wind speed, estimating the average wind power density must base on 
the long-time observation data.  
 
Wind speed and electricity 
The supply of wind power is intermittently provided by nature. Hence, it is necessary to 
build reserve capacity to ensure the reliable supply of wind power. Wind-powered turbines 
make use of kinetic energy to power a generator to produce electricity. For turbines, the 
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effective wind power is generated at an interval of wind speed from start wind speed to 
stop wind speed (Xue, et al, 2001). There is no electricity produced with either an overlow 
wind speed or with an overhigh wind speed. By revising the formula applied in Gabrielsen, 
et al. (2005), the potential production for wind power during period t , windte  can be 
calculated as follows: 
3
tt
wind
t vae ≤                                                      (2.2) 
Where ta , represents all other factors, except wind speed, during period t , and it represents 
the production capacity in wind plants; tv  is the average effective wind speed during 
period t . We would represent the whole term, 3tt va as tq  for simplification. Then, the 
relationship between the wind power product and the wind speed is: 
t
wind
t qe ≤                                                          (2.3) 
 
The utilization of wind power 
There are two ways of utilizing wind power in the world. One is off-grid utilization and 
the other is in-grid utilization. Off-grid utilization is used as an independent power 
generation system which is often built in rural areas. Usually, the power generation 
capacity of the off-grid generation system is smaller than that of the in-grid one. In this 
study, we will focus on in-grid wind power generation system.  
 
2.2 Wind power in the world 
Wind is the world’s fastest growing energy source today. Installed capacity in 2005 grew 
by 40.5% so that the total global installed capacity at the end of the year was 59,084 MW. 
Those countries with the highest total installed capacity are Germany (18,428 MW), Spain 
(10,027 MW), the USA (9,149 MW), India (4,430 MW), and Denmark (3,122 MW). The 
other countries, including Italy, the UK, China, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, have 
reached the 1,000 MW mark (GWEC, 2006). The top-ten countries, leading in wind 
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energy generation, are listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Global leaders in wind energy generation in 2005 
Country  Installed capacity, MW Percentage  
Germany  18,428 31.19% 
Spain  10,027 16.97% 
The USA 9,149 15.49% 
India  4,430 7.50% 
Denmark  3,122 5.28% 
Italy  1,717 2.91% 
The UK 1,353 2.29% 
China 1,260 2.13% 
Japan 1,231 2.08% 
The Netherlands 1,219 2.06% 
Other regions 7,148 12.10% 
The sum of the world 59,084 100% 
 
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the development of wind power in the 
world-leading countries are somewhat attributed to their appropriate policy regimes. They 
designed and established different policy regimes according to their own market status. 
The most common incentive mechanisms work as fixed price tariffs which are functioned 
in Germany, Spain and Denmark and compulsory renewable quota which are now in use in 
20 U.S. states and several other counties as well, including Italy, the UK, Japan and 
Australia.. However, all incentives must be embedded in legal and fiscal context. (The 
World Bank, 2000) 
 
According to ‘wind force 12’ (GWEC, 2005), by the end of year 2020, the total global 
installed capacity is estimated to be at 1,231 GW, over twenty times bigger than last year’s, 
so that wind power electricity would account for 12% of overall global electricity. The 
blueprint of ‘wind force 12’ indicates that wind power must be an integral part to resolve 
global energy problems. Wind power is not dispensable any longer. It becomes a rising 
industry with the great prospect for commercial development. It is reasonable to believe 
that wind power would be one of the most important alternative energy resources in the 
near future. 
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2.3 Wind power in China 
With the large land mass and long coastline, China possesses world-class wind resources. 
An early meteorological data report (Xue, et al., 2001) recommended that the total 
exploitable on-shore wind capacity at 10 meters above the ground level in China is 253 
GW. Recently, “the off-shore wind potential has been estimated at 750 GW” (Ku, et al., 
2005), which would nearly double China’s total energy generation capacity. In China, 
areas rich in wind power resources are mainly found in two areas: northern China’s 
grasslands and Gobi desert, stretching from Inner Mongolia, Gansu, and Xinjiang 
provinces; and in the east coast from Shandong, Liaoling and the southeast coast in Fujian 
and Guangdong provinces (Feller, 2006). Wind resource in different regions in China is 
shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
It was said that although China has huge exploitable wind potentialities and has been 
developing wind resources for over 15 years, the wind power output was only equivalent 
to that of some small coal-fired plants, in other words, the consumption of energy is less 
than one percent concerning wind power (Feller, 2006). The development of wind power 
in China is not only behind the developed countries but is also behind some developing 
countries, such as India. China’s development of wind power started around the mid 80’s. 
Over the past few years, wind power generation developed rapidly, with the installed 
capacity increasing from 224 MW in 1998 to 1,260 MW in 2005 (Zhang, et al., 2000; 
GWEC, 2006). By the end of 2005, the mainland had already built 59 wind plants with 
1,854 wind turbine generators (Shi, 2006). In the late 2005, according to the government’s 
“National Middle and Large Term Development Plan”, the wind power target for 2010 is 5 
GW, and for 2020 is 30GW (Feller, 2006). 
 
Six years ago, there was such a surplus in electricity generation that the government did 
little to encourage wind power because wind costs were too high. Unfortunately, staring in 
2003, China faced severe electricity shortages due to problematic coal, transport links, and 
water shortages. (Ku, et al., 2005) Thereafter wind power has played a more important 
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Figure 2.2 China’s Wind Power Potential  
 
black = good, dark grey = ok, grey = poor 
 
role in the electricity industry, but the high-cost is still the key barrier to restrain the 
expansion of wind power in China. Some studies show that the cost of coal-fired power is 
50% lower than that of wind power in China. (Zhang and Zhao, 2006) Nowadays, the 
central and local governments are keeping an eye on the development of wind power. 
They are making great effort to lower its cost from multiple perspectives on technology, 
commerce and regulation. For example, they are making effort to develop and exploit 
more wind power through some mechanisms such as Build-Operate-Transfer (B.O.T.)2 and 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)3 to support electricity industry. All the facts above 
show that the development of Chinese wind power is just beginning and there is still a 
very long way ahead. 
                                    
2 According to Renewable Resource Development Center, the Build-Operate-Transfer (B.O.T.) project in 
China is defined as the project that only the eligible cooperation is permitted to have the exclusive right to 
develop wind power in the certain region. 
 
3 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms aimed at 
helping industrialized countries meet their greenhouse gas reduction targets. With this mechanism, China 
will construct more wind plants by obtaining financial assistance from some developed countries and realize 
both reduction of greenhouse gas and the development of wind power.  
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3 The basic model 
Before we begin with the model, I would like to explain that as mentioned at the beginning 
of the Chapter 2, water resource is a renewable stock resource. The hydropower problem 
with the reservoir could therefore be taken as a dynamic problem because the water used 
to produce electricity today can alternatively be used tomorrow (Førsund, 2005). Unlike 
water resource, wind resource is a renewable flow resource. We do not have something 
like reservoirs to store the wind coming today and use it tomorrow although there may be 
residual wind coming today. In this study, thereby, the model is static one.  
 
3.1 Necessary hypotheses for setting the models 
Based on Zhu’s report (2006), except for the eastern coastal areas summer (from June to 
August) is a scarcity season in the northern part of China. The model would be greatly 
simplified if we ignore the scarcity period during which the supply of wind power 
electricity is limited to a great extent, and may not meet the demand of wind power for 
lack of the available wind energy. It is reasonable to consider that the electricity producer 
would use other energy sources, such as coal, to generate electricity during this period. 
 
In addition, due to the real status that the current installed capacity of wind power is much 
less than the potentially exploitable capacity of wind resource in China because of some 
limitations such as technology, the plant scales, etc., it is reasonable to suppose that the 
available wind resources are enough so that the producers could control how much they 
should use to produce electricity during any periodT . Here T  is different from t  I used 
in Chapter 2. T  is assumed to be any calendar year counted from January to December 
(removing scarcity months if necessary). Furthermore we assume that the technology for 
transferring wind to electricity is perfect which means the equal sign must be applied in 
the production function (2.3)  
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3.2 The objective function and constrains 
Suppose there are only two kinds of electricity products in a specific region. One is wind 
power the other is coal-fired power. According to the microeconomic theory, utility can be 
thought of as a numeric measure of the total consumption of wind power and coal-fired 
power. The utility function during period T  is:  
)(eU , 0)(' ≥eU , 0)(" ≤eU  (3.1) 
The utility function has standard properties of concavity. The marginal utility depends on 
the utility function that we use to reflect the consumers’ willingness to pay to the total 
production of wind power and coal-fired power. Now, we measure the marginal utility, 
,'U  in money, and define the marginal utility as the marginal willingness to pay, p . The 
inverse demand function for electricity therefore is:  
)()(' epeU =  (3.2 ) 
where p  will also be denoted as price of electricity in the following content. We assume 
that the price for electricity does not discriminate on whether the energy resources are 
renewable or not, in other words, the willingness to pay of wind power is just the same as 
that of coal-fired power.  
 
From the government’s point of view, we are interested in pursuing social optimum, in 
other words, concentrating on both consumer surplus and producer surplus. The demand 
curve would be shaped based on the demand function (3.2) above. On the other hand, we 
would use the marginal cost curve to measure plants’ supply decision. 
 
We will now introduce the cost function of wind power through the similar way adopted in 
Førsund (2005). In a real market, there must not be only one wind plant. Let us suppose 
that there are N  wind plants in the market (Actually, according to Shi (2005), by the end 
of 2005, there are six wind plants constructed in Inner Mongolia region). The wind power 
production from a plant during period T is represented as windie , and each plant has an 
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upper generation capacity, windie  ( Ni ,...,2,1= ). The upper generation capacity depends on 
the installation capacity and the amount of available wind resources. We know that the 
total costs can always be written as the sum of fixed costs and variable costs. In the case of 
wind power, the fixed component of the total annual cost is contributed by the initial 
investment, and the variable costs consist of the expenditure on operating and maintaining 
(Mathew, 2006). We do not give a specific cost function here in order to simplify the 
problem, and the marginal cost for wind power production is assumed to be constant, 
which means the rate of the change in costs for any change in output is constant. We can 
describe the cost function during period T as follows: 
NieeCcecc windi
wind
ii
wind
i
wind
i ,...,2,1,,),(
' =≤==  (3.3) 
where C  is a non-negative constant. 
Our goal is to minimize the cost of producing a given level of the total output in this 
specific region: 
Nieeee
ts
ecMin
wind
i
wind
i
wind
N
i
wind
i
N
i
wind
i
,...,2,1,,
..
)(
1
1
=≤≥∑
∑
=
=
  (3.4) 
where winde  is the given level of the total output in this region. 
 
The Lagrangian is: 
Niee
ee
ecL
wind
i
wind
i
N
i
i
N
i
windwind
i
N
i
wind
i
,...,2,1),(
)(
)(
1
1
1
=−−
+−−
−=
∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
ν
μ     (3.5) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
00' ≥⊥≤−+−=∂
∂ wind
iiiwind
i
ec
e
L νμ   (3.6a) 
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),0(0
1
wind
N
i
wind
i eeif −<−=≥ ∑
=
μ       (3.6b) 
ifi ,0(0 =≥ν Niee windiwindi ,...,2,1), =<    (3.6c) 
It is not hard to find from conditions (3.6a) and (3.6c) that the producer i  would produce 
nothing if the marginal cost for plant i  is greater than the shadow priceμ , i.e. if μ>'ic , 
then 0=windie . Assuming for any given level of the total output, we get a set of plants 
producing positive output. For each of these plants, its production during period T  must 
be positive, i.e. 0>windie . According to condition (3.6a), it yields: 
iic νμ −='      (3.7) 
To make sense of equality (3.7), μ must be greater than zero so that the first constraint for 
the problem (3.4) must be binding. Then it is not difficult to find that the optimal choice 
on allocating the outputs within these plants is that we rank these plants in order of 
increasing marginal cost, and make them reached their full capacity orderly. In other 
words, such plant will be ranked first to reach its full capacity that has the smallest 
marginal cost, which performs as merit order rank4. Thus the overall cost function 
approximately is:  
wind
N
i
wind
i
windwind eeeCcecc =≤== ∑
=1
,'),(    (3.8) 
where winde is the aggregate upper generation capacity for wind power. 
 
The way for setting the cost function for coal-fired power is similar with what we just did 
for wind power. Assuming there are M coal-fired plants in this region, and each plant has  
                                    
4merit order rank: according to dictionary of energy, in cases where multiple generation sources are available, 
generating facilities and individual generating units within those facilities are ranked according to their 
availability and the price that will be applied to the energy they produce. This ranking is referred to as merit 
order rank. 
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an upper capacity coalje  for generation 
coal
je  ),...,2,1( Mj = , which only depends on the 
plant’s scale. The cost of coal-fired power can also be described as the sum of fixed costs 
and variable costs. The variable costs of producing coal-fired power cling to the coal 
prices. The coal price may vary for some reasons such as the quality, the distance and 
consumers’ demands on electricity. Similarly, we do not give a specific cost function here 
for simplification, and the marginal cost for coal-fired power production is assumed to be 
positive which means the cost increases as more coal-fired power electricity is produced. 
We describe the coal-fired power cost function as follows: 
Mjeececc coalj
coal
j
coal
jj ,...,2,1,,0),(
' =≤>=   (3.9) 
Our goal is still to minimize the cost of producing a given level of the total coal-fired 
power output in this region: 
Mjeeee
ts
ecMin
coal
j
coal
j
coal
M
j
coal
j
M
j
coal
j
,...,2,1,,
..
)(
1
1
=≤≥∑
∑
=
=
  (3.10) 
where coale  is the given level of the total output. 
Similarly, the overall cost function can be written as follows: 
coal
M
j
coal
j
coalcoal eeeccecc =≤>>= ∑
=1
''' ,0,0),(   (3.11) 
where coale  is aggregate upper generation capacity for coal-fired power.  
 
Additionally, considering the environmental problem, the damage from using coal-fired 
power, )( coaled , is can be regarded as an external cost which measures how 
environmental cost changes when coal-fired power output changes. However, to simplify 
our problem, we temporarily take )( coaled  as zero in this study. 
 
As mentioned before, we would pursue a social optimum, in other words, the objective 
function is to maximize the consumer surplus plus producer surplus. The objective 
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function accordingly can be descried as follows:  
)()()(
0
coalwind
ee
x
ececdxxpMax
coalwind
−−∫+
=
  (3.12) 
 
Let us now move to constraints. Firstly, we notice that if there is no MMS policy, only two 
constrains on production capacities should be involved in. One is that windwind ee ≤ , the 
other is coalcoal ee ≤ . However, in order to analyses MMS policy, besides the constraints 
on production capacities, another constraint should be added. For instance, the government 
would mandate a minimal absolute quantity of wind power production, W , in period T . 
This mandated target of wind power output, W , should be set within the interval of zero 
to wind power’s upper generation capacity. The extra constraint, in mathematical terms, is 
Wewind ≥  ( windeW ≤<0 ). 
So far, we can describe the social planning problem without MMS policy as:  
coalcoalwindwind
coalwind
ee
x
n
eeee
ts
ececdxxpMax
coalwind
≤≤
−−∫+
=
,
..
)()()(
0
  (3.13) 
The lowercase n  indicates that the problem we investigated is the one without MMS 
policy.  
Lagrange function is: 
)(
)(
)()()(
0
coalcoal
n
windwind
n
coalwind
ee
x
n
ee
ee
ececdxxpL
coalwind
−−
−−
−−= ∫+
=
γ
λ    (3.14) 
The first-order conditions are: 
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where )(' windec  is equal to a non-negative constant C  for short below.  
 
Then the social planning problem with MMS policy can be described as:  
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where windeW ≤<0 . 
Lagrange function is: 
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The first-order conditions are: 
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4 Welfare comparison for the scenarios with or without MMS  
In Chapter 3, we constructed the welfare-maximizing model by mixing wind power with 
coal-fired power. Here we continue that investigation thought the welfare analysis for the 
scenarios with or without MMS policy. In order to be close to the current power market, 
there is an important assumption which is applicable to both the scenarios with or without 
MMS policy: the output of coal-fired power is always positive, mathematically, 0>coale .  
 
4.1 The first comparison 
Based on our assumptions, for the scenario without MMS policy, we can rewrite the 
conditions of (3.15) as: 
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 (4.1) 
According to conditions of (4.1), we notice that there will be two possible situations 
existing in the market. One is that wind power will not be used in the situation where: 
)()(' windn
coal
n ececp ′<+= γ  (4.2) 
If the market price is less than the value of wind power’s marginal cost, the wind power 
will not be used, in other words, only coal-fired electricity exists in the market.  
 
The other possibility is that both wind power and coal-fired power are used in the situation 
where: 
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However, referring to the scenario with MMS policy, we notice that besides our previous 
assumption, 0>coale , the output of wind power must also be positive, i.e. 0>winde  
because of the introduction of MMS policy, i.e. Wewind ≥ ( windeW ≤<0 ). We say that 
there is only one possible situation in the market, that is, wind power will coexist with 
coal-fired power. Accordingly, conditions of (3.18) could be rearranged as follows: 
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wind
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4.2 The second comparison 
4.2.1 The eight cases 
Note that, the conditions of (4.4) may fall into eight cases according to the different 
combination of shadow prices’ notation. In this section, we will make the following eight 
comparisons to explain further why we need MMS policy. In order to make the 
comparisons easier, when we consider the scenario without MMS policy, we will only 
consider the possibility that wind power is used in the market. Moreover, to simplify the 
problems, we would only discuss the situation where the solutions exist. We now start the 
systematic procedure: 
 
Case I  ,0=nλ  0=nγ  (without MMS), versus, 00,0 >== βγλ and  (with MMS) 
 
First, look at the scenario without MMS. Rearranging conditions of (4.3), yields: 
coalcoalwindwind
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n
eeee
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,
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  (4.5a) 
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Note that, from the first condition of (4.5a), the two marginal cost curves intersect at the 
optimal allocation point. Suppose that the demand curve, the coal-fired’s marginal cost 
curve, and the upper generation capacities are given. In Figure 4.1(a), they are depicted by 
solid lines. Then according to the conditions of (4.5a), the wind’s marginal cost curve 
shaped as in Figure 4.1(a). Note that the value of the market price is determined by the 
shape of the wind’s marginal cost curve. The market price would therefore be set within a 
closed interval [ ]21 , nn pp . At the 1np  level, the full capacity of wind power will be 
reached. Outputs of coal-fired power and wind power are respectively coale1  and 
winde . At 
the 2np  level, the full capacity of coal-fired power will be reached, the outputs of 
coal-fired power and wind power are respectively coale  and winde2 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now move to the scenario with MMS. We have that windwind eeW ≤=  and coalcoal ee ≤ . 
The former item indicates the wind output, in the market, is just equal to the mandated 
target, W . There is no extra wind power output in the market. The latter one says the 
coal-fired output is either equal to upper capacity or less than it. Rearranging the 
conditions of (4.4), yields:  
winde
winde2
)('1
windec  
Figure 4.1(a) Social optima for the scenario with ,0=nλ  0=nγ  
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   (4.5b) 
From (4.5b) we learn that although the market price is less than the marginal cost of wind 
power at the optimal allocation point, the wind power exists in the market because of the 
MMS policy. However, we also note that in order to make MMS policy possible, we must 
provide some supporting measures to support MMS policy. The governmental subsidy 
could be one of those supporting measures. For example, the government should let the 
amount of the subsidy at least equalβ . We can depict this scenario in Figure 4.1(b). 
Taking demand curve, two marginal cost curves and two upper generation capacities given, 
the market price would be set according to the value of W . With a smaller target of wind 
power output, 1W , the market decides the price at 1p  level. At the same time, the full 
capacity of coal-fired power will be reached. With a larger target of wind power output, 
such as the full capacity 2W , the market price would be set at 2p  level. At the same time, 
the contribution from coal-fired power is coale2 , and from wind power is 2W . The 
supporting measure 2β  is stronger than 1β . 
 
 
2p
1p
Figure 4.1(b) Social optima for the scenario with 0,0 >== βγλ  
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From Figure 4.1(b), we also notice that if W , the target of wind power output, is big 
enough (in this case, 21 WWW << ), then the full capacity of coal-fired power will not be 
reached. In other words, the overall electricity demand is satisfied whilst the utilization of 
coal-fired power is limited to some extent, which contributes to a better environment.  
 
Comparing Figure 4.1(b) with Figure 4.1(a), if we adopt the same demand curve, the 
coal-fired’s marginal cost curve, and the upper capacity vertical lines in both the scenarios 
with and without MMS, although the shapes of wind’s marginal cost curves are different, 
the market price and the outputs allocation in the scenario with MMS could also be the 
same as those in the scenario without MMS, as long as the target value is set within a 
proper interval. Of course, the advantage of performing MMS policy, in this case, is that 
the target output of wind power, W , could be realized even under the circumstance that 
the level of wind power’s marginal cost is higher than the market price at the optimal 
allocation point. 
 
Case II  ,0=nλ 0=nγ  (without MMS), versus, 0=λ , 00 == βγ and  (with MMS) 
 
For the scenario with MMS, we accordingly have that windwind eeW ≤≤  and coalcoal ee ≤ . 
From the former item we know that wind power output is at least as much as the mandated 
target. Rearranging the conditions of (4.4), yields:  
)(')(')( coalwindcoalwind ececeep ==+        (4.6) 
We notice that the condition of (4.6) is similar with the one in the scenario without MMS 
discussed in Case I (see conditions of 4.5(a)). It is not hard to conclude that as long as all 
five curves and vertical lines in the scenario without MMS are the same as those in the 
scenario with MMS, the optimal solutions in these two scenarios must be the same as well, 
no matter we perform MMS policy or not. 
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Case III  ,0=nλ 0>nγ  (without MMS), versus, 0=λ , 00 >> βγ and  (with MMS) 
 
Look at the scenario without MMS firstly. Rearranging conditions of (4.3), yields: 
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Suppose that the demand curve, the coal-fired’s marginal cost curve, and the upper 
capacity vertical lines are given as depicted in Figure 4.2(a). Since the coal-fired’s upper 
capacity is reached, the market price would be set within an open interval ( 21 , nn pp ), 
where the value of 1np  is equal to the coal-fired’s marginal cost at its full capacity point, 
and the value of 2np  is set when the demand curve intersect with coal-fired’s full 
capacity vertical line. If the wind’s marginal cost curve would shape as in Figure 4.2(a), 
the market price would be set at np  level, and the outputs for coal-fired power and wind 
power are, respectively, 
coale  and 
wind
ne .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now move to the scenario with MMS. We have that windwind eeW ≤=  and 
wind
ne
nγ
winde
)(' windec  
Figure 4.2(a) Social optima for the scenario with ,0=nλ  0>nγ  
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coalcoal ee = , which indicate that wind power output is just equal to the mandated target and 
coal-fired power output is at full capacity level. Rearranging the conditions of (4.4), 
yields:  
)(')(')(
)(')(')(
coalcoalcoalwind
windwindcoalwind
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>⇒+=+
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γ
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        (4.7b) 
In this case, the demand curve, the two marginal cost curves, and the two upper capacity 
vertical lines are given as depicted in Figure 4.2(b). Then the market price would be set 
according to the target value of W . Since the coal-fired’s full capacity reached, the 
market price must be greater than 0p . It will be set in accordance with the target of wind 
power output. Keeping all other conditions fixed, with a smaller target of wind power 
outputs, 1W , the market would set the price at 1p  level. At the same time the shadow 
price on coal resource is at 1γ  level. With a larger target of wind power outputs, 2W , the 
market price would be set at 2p  level whilst the shadow price of coal resource is at 2γ  
level. Apparently, a larger target brings more clean electricity. 
 
 
 
From (4.7b) we also know that MMS policy with necessary supporting measures make 
wind power existed in the market although the market price is less than wind power’s 
winde  
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Figure 4.2(b) Social optima for the scenario with 0,0,0 >>= βγλ  
Demand
p  
e
1W
1β
)(' coalec  
)(' windec )(' windec
Demand
1γ  
2γ
winde
PROMOTING WIND POWER IN CHINA 
Welfare Analysis of Mandated Market Share (MMS) 
24
marginal cost at the optimal allocation point. 
 
Figure 4.3 is trying to compare optimum for the scenario without MMS with the scenario 
with MMS by giving the same demand curve, marginal cost curves and upper capacity 
vertical lines. It is not difficult to see that with MMS, at the optimal allocation point, wind 
power electricity is equal to the target W  and the market price is at p  level; without 
MMS, at the optimal allocation point, wind power electricity is only windne  and the market 
price is at np  level, where 
wind
ne  is less than W  and np  is higher than p . Then we 
conclude that in this case, MMS policy performs well on producing wind power. 
 
 
 
Case IV  ,0=nλ 0>nγ  (without MMS), versus, 0=λ , 00 => βγ and  (with MMS) 
 
For the scenario with MMS, we accordingly have that windwind eeW ≤≤  and coalcoal ee = . 
From the former item we know that wind power output is at least as much as the mandated 
target. The latter item shows that the coal-fired’s full capacity must be reached. 
Rearranging the conditions of (4.4), yields:  
nγ
np βp  
coale
Figure 4.3 Comparison the social optimum for the scenario with MMS policy where 
,0=λ  0,0 >> βγ  with that for the scenario without MMS policy where 
,0=nλ 0>nγ  
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It is easy to see that the conditions of (4.8) are similar with the first two conditions of 
(4.7a). Therefore, we conclude that as long as all other conditions are the same, there is no 
improvement even if we perform MMS policy.  
 
Case V  0>nλ , 0=nγ  (without MMS), versus, 0>λ , 0,0 >= βγ  ( with MMS) 
 
We firstly discuss the scenario without MMS. Note that coalcoalwindwind eeee ≤= , . The full 
capacity of wind power must be reached. Rearranging the conditions of (4.3) yields 
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  (4.9a) 
From (4.9a), we know that at the optimal allocation point, the market price is equal to the 
marginal cost of coal-fired power but greater than the marginal cost of wind power.  
 
Moving to the scenario with MMS, we have the facts that windwind eWe ==  and 
coalcoal ee ≤ . The first item indicates that the mandated target of wind power must be set at 
its full capacity level and the target must be accomplished. From the second item we say 
that keeping two full capacities and the coal-fired power’s marginal cost curve fixed, 
whether the coal-fired power output is less than full capacity or as much as full capacity 
depending on what the overall demand curve looks like. Rearranging the conditions of 
(4.4), yields: 
)('
)('
coal
wind
ecp
ecp
=
−+= βλ
    (4.9b) 
From (4.9b) we know that at the optimal allocation point, the market price would be equal 
to the coal-fired’s marginal cost, but the relationship between the market price and the 
wind’s marginal cost depends on the values of λ  and β . In both figure 4.4(a) and figure 
4.4(b), at the optimal allocation point, the wind’s marginal cost is depicted as curve 
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)(1
windec′ , which is lower than the market price if λ  is greater thanβ ; looks like curve 
)(2
windec′ , which is equal to the market price if λ  is equal toβ ; and is depicted as curve 
)(3
windec′ , which is higher than the market price if λ  is less than β . In the third 
situation, the supporting measure has to be set. According to the different shapes of the 
demand curves, the coal-fired full capacity would not be reached in figure 4.4(a) but 
realized in figure 4.4(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
Old Demand 
Figure 4.4(b) Social optima of the scenario with 0,0 => γλ and 
0>β where the full capacity of coal-fired power is reached. 
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Figure 4.4(a) Social optima of the scenario with 0,0 => γλ and 
0>β where the full capacity of coal-fired power is not 
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Comparing the scenario without MMS with the scenario with MMS, in this case, we 
conclude the wind power’s marginal cost curve can not be depicted as curve )(2
windec′ or 
)(3
windec′  if there is no MMS policy. 
 
Case VI  0>nλ , 0=nγ  (without MMS), versus, 0>λ , 00 == βγ and  (with MMS) 
 
With MMS policy, we accordingly have that windwind eeW =≤  and coalcoal ee ≤ . From the 
first item we know that the full capacity of wind power will be reached which indicates 
that the mandated target is undoubtedly accomplished. The second item has the same 
explanation as that in Case V. Rearranging conditions of (4.4), yields: 
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windwind
ecp
ecpecp
=
>⇒+= λ
   (4.10) 
Comparing the conditions of (4.10) with the ones of (4.9a), it is easy to conclude that 
whether MMS policy exists or not, the wind’s full capacity must be reached. Keeping 
demand curve, two marginal curves, and vertical lines are the same in these two scenarios, 
MMS policy does not affect the social optimal solutions. We illustrate one possibility in 
Figure 4.5, where optimal outputs for wind power and coal-fired power are, respectively, 
winde  and coale* .  
 
 
nλλ /
)(' windec
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Figure 4.5 Social optima for the scenario with 
0,0,0 ==> βγλ  and the scenario with 0>nλ , 0=nγ  
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Case VII  0>nλ , 0>nγ  (without MMS), versus, 0>λ , 0,0 >> βγ  (with MMS) 
 
In this case, for the scenario without MMS, we have that: 
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  (4.11a) 
where both outputs are at the full capacity level. At the optimal allocation point, no matter 
what the values of the two marginal costs are, the market price should be higher than the 
bigger one.  
 
Turning to scenario with MMS, we have the facts that windwind eWe ==  and coalcoal ee = . 
Note that the mandated target must be set at the wind’s full capacity level, and coal-fired’s 
full capacity is also reached. Rearranging the conditions of (4.4), yields: 
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   (4.11b) 
From (4.11b) we know that at the optimal allocation point, the market price must be higher 
than the coal-fired’s marginal cost but the relationship between the market price and the 
wind’s marginal cost depends on the values of λ  and β . Unlike the scenario without 
MMS, in this scenario with MMS, the wind’s marginal cost can be depicted as in Figure 
4.6. It may shape as curve )(1
windec′ , which is lower than the market price if λ  is greater 
than β ; like curve )(2 windec′ , which is equal to the market price if λ  is equal to β ; and 
as curve )(3
windec′ , which is higher than the market price if λ  is less than β . In the 
third situation, the supporting measure has to be considered.  
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Case VIII  0>nλ , 0>nγ (without MMS), versus, 0>λ , 00 => βγ and (with MMS) 
 
In this case, for the scenario with MMS, we accordingly have that windwind eeW =≤  and 
coalcoal ee = . They show that the both wind power and coal-fired power’s full capacities are 
reached. Rearranging the conditions of (4.4), yields:  
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   (4.12) 
From (4.12) we know that at the optimal allocation point, no matter what values of these 
two marginal costs are, the market price should be higher than the bigger value of these 
two marginal costs. At the same time, both kinds of powers’ full capacities would be 
reached. This status in real life can similarly be understood as the overall demand exceeds 
overall supply for electricity.  
 
Comparing conditions of (4.12) with ones of (4.11a), it is intuitively clear that in this case, 
suppose demand curve, marginal cost curves, and full capacity vertical lines are given, no 
matter we perform MMS policy or not, the optimal solutions are the same. The Figure 4.7 
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Figure 4.6 Social optima of the scenario with 
0,0 >> γλ and 0>β where both full capacities 
are reached. 
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gives an example with the situation where )(')(' coalwind ecec >  at the optimal allocation 
point. 
 
 
 
4.2.2 With a zero marginal cost on wind power 
In real life the marginal cost on wind power are not zero, but for our purposes it is helpful 
to investigate the mixed system with a zero marginal cost, since we can then know in what 
situations MMS policy can function. Moreover, the case of zero marginal cost assumption 
can approximately be understood as CDM where almost all initial costs for wind power 
are granted by some industrial countries whilst variable costs can approximately be taken 
as zero because the fuel-wind-is free. Similarly, we investigate the social optimization 
problem without MMS firstly. Therefore the problem can be described by slightly altering 
the problem (3.13) as follows: 
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Lagrange function is: 
Figure 4.7 Social optima for the scenario with 
0,0,0 =>> βγλ  and the scenario with 0>nλ , 0>nγ  
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The first-conditions are: 
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It is reasonable to suppose the market price is positive. From conditions of (4.15), nλ  
must be positive, the full capacity of wind power therefore must be reached. It is easy to 
understand that wind power could priorly be used since there is no cost, and coal-fired 
power will participate only if wind power’s full capacity is reached. Based on the 
discussion above, we notice that the coal-fired power would face a residual demand curve 
and how much the coal-fired power produced depends on the residual demand curve. Then 
the total consumption of electricity is winde  plus coale* . In Figure 4.8, panel A, the heavy 
line is the overall demand curve. Since the full capacity of wind power, winde , will priorly 
be reached, the demand curve faced by coal-fired power then would parallel shift left by  
winde . Since the full capacity of coal-fired power is much greater than that of wind power, 
the contribution from coal-fired power would be determined by the residual demand curve 
together with coal-fired’s marginal cost curve as depicted as in panel B. 
 
Based on the analyses above, it is easy to conclude that the optimal problem could be 
solved whilst the wind power have been used maximally without MMS policy. In other 
words, the MMS policy would be redundant in the CDM case. Of course, the CDM project 
is significantly beneficial to the development of wind power, and worthy to be developed 
greatly.  
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4.2.3 A brief summing up 
From previous analyses, we know that without MMS policy, the wind power would be 
used in the market only if the market price is greater or equal to the wind power’s marginal 
cost at the optimal allocation point. In Case I, III, V and VII, the performance of MMS 
policy might make a positive wind power output possible even if the marginal cost of wind 
power may higher than the market price at the optimal allocation point. However, this does 
not mean that a positive target of wind power must take place without any supporting 
measures. Therefore, we say that assist in implementing the MMS, supporting measures 
are necessarily required. In Case II, IV, VI, the MMS policy does not have remarkable 
functions any more in the market where the level of market price is greater or equal to the 
wind’s marginal cost at the optimal allocation point. In Case VIII and CDM case, the 
excess of electricity demand and a zero marginal cost on wind power respectively make 
MMS policy seem like redundant.  
residual demand 
)(epn)(epn
coale*
winde  
Figure 4.8 In panel A, the full capacity curve of wind power and the overall demand 
curve determine that the demand curve for coal-fired power would shift 
inward of the overall demand curve; in panel B, the residual demand curve 
and the marginal cost curve for coal-fired power determine the optimal 
market price and the contribution from coal-fired power. 
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5 Market organization 
In the preceding chapters we have analyzed the consequences by introducing MMS policy 
in the social planning model. In this chapter we turn to investigate MMS policy in two 
different market organizations, a competitive market and a monopoly market. In this 
chapter, we continue to suppose there are only wind power electricity and coal-fired power 
electricity in the market, and the output of coal-fired power is always positive, i.e. 0>coale . 
Moreover, the market price does not discriminate on the energy resources.  
 
5.1 Free competition with MMS 
Consider a competitive industry that there are a number of small plants to supply either 
wind power electricity or coal-fired electricity. Recalling the process of constructing cost 
functions in Chapter 3, it is nature to think the behavior of these suppliers is similar. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to treat all small wind power suppliers as an aggregate unit to 
simplify the problem. Also we would treat all suppliers of coal-fired power as another 
aggregate unit. In other words, there are only one wind power supplier and one coal-fired 
power supplier existing in this market. Then we continue to use the cost functions as we 
constructed in Chapter 3. Assume that there is no uncertainty, so the market price p is 
known.  
 
We now introduce MMS policy in this market. Therefore, the profit maximization problem 
of wind power producer is: 
)0(,
..
)(
windwindwindwind
windwind
eWWeee
ts
ecepMax
≤<≥≤
−⋅
 (5.1) 
Lagrange function is: 
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The first-order conditions are: 
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 (5.3) 
Note that the output of wind power must be positive due to the introduction of MMS 
policy in this model, i.e. 0>winde . We can rewrite the conditions of (5.3) as: 
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 (5.4) 
 
Now, we move to the profit maximization problem of coal-fired power producer. 
coalcoal
coalcoal
ee
ts
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≤
−⋅
..
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 (5.5) 
Lagrange function is: 
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The first-order conditions are: 
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Taking account of our assumption, 0>coale ,the conditions of (5.7) can be rewritten as:  
)0(0
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Combining conditions of (5.4) with conditions of (5.8), since the market price does not 
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discriminate on energy resources and could be regarded as given, it is nature to have: 
)0(0
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 (5.9) 
Comparing the private conditions of (5.9) with the social conditions of (4.4) we have that 
if the marginal cost curves, the level of full capacities and the overall demand curve faced 
by the producers are the same as those in the social planning problem, then a competitive 
market will sustain the social solutions.  
 
5.2 Monopoly with MMS 
Suppose that the consumers are indifferent between wind power electricity and coal-fired 
power electricity. We now turn to the case by considering the monopolist as a single 
production unit to produce either coal-fired power or wind power electricity. Similarly, the 
cost functions we constructed in Chapter 3 are also applied to this market. In current 
Chinese power market, the grid company can approximately be regarded as a monopolist 
who chooses the price to sell either coal-fired power or wind power output to consumers 
so that maximize its overall profits. We assume that the monopolist faces the demand 
function coalwind eeeepp +== ),( . The optimization problem of the monopolist with 
MMS policy is: 
Weeeeeeee
ts
ececeepMax
windcoalcoalwindwindcoalwind
coalwind
≥≤≤+=
−−⋅
,,,
..
)()()(
 (5.10) 
where 
wind
eW ≤<0  
Lagrange function is: 
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The first-order conditions are: 
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Taking into account our assumptions of 0>winde , 0>coale  and the property of 
0)( <′ ep , the conditions of (5.12) can be rewritten as: 
)0(0
)0(0
)0(0
)()()(
)()()(
coalcoal
wind
windwind
coalcoalwindcoal
windcoalwindwind
eeif
Weif
eeif
ecpeepecp
ecpeepecp
<=≥
>=≥
<=≥
+′>⇒+⋅′−+′=
−+′>⇒+⋅′−−+′=
γ
β
λ
γγ
βλβλ
 (5.13) 
Let us suppose that the monopolist faces the same overall demand function, cost functions, 
and energy capacities as that in the competitive case, and the mandated targets are same in 
these two markets. Comparing the monopolistic conditions of (5.13) with the competitive 
conditions of (5.9), it is not hard to conclude: suppose that the electricity outputs 
consumed in monopolistic case are identical to that consumed in competitive case, then 
the market price chosen by the monopolist must be higher than the price set by 
competitive market. For this reason, consumers will typically be worse off in a market 
organized as a monopoly than in one organized competitively. In other words, the 
monopolistic case is inefficient.  
 
PROMOTING WIND POWER IN CHINA 
Welfare Analysis of Mandated Market Share (MMS) 
37
6 Discussion 
As we have mentioned in first two chapters, wind power electricity should be developed in 
China because it is a good alternative to meet the increasing demand of electricity and it is 
not harmful to both global and local environment. It is reasonable to believe that China 
would be better off if wind power electricity develop on a larger scale.  
 
6.1 Why MMS 
Some studies indicate that high costs are the key barriers to the restraint of the expansion 
of wind power in China. According to the World Bank (2001) in the development of wind 
power, there are three important stages which developed countries traditionally have gone 
through. They are: technology development, cost reduction, and market building. In 
technology development stage, countries focused on developing technology and making it 
reliable. Usually, they were devoted themselves to the domestic wide-scale manufacture of 
large, high-quality turbines. Once the technologies were mature, the focus shifted to cost 
reduction. In cost reduction stage, countries might encourage further technological 
development and seek fiscal or other incentives to reduce the wind power’s cost. When the 
technologies were reliable and the cost reduction was achieved, the market for wind power 
would be ready for growing substantially. The most direct way to create a market is 
through a legal requirement on supply or purchase of wind power electricity. The legal 
requirement is demonstrated an effective approach taken by world-leading wind power 
countries to develop wind power industry. Two fundamentally different policy regimes are 
always introduced. One is that the government sets the price and the market determines the 
quantity (such as German Feed-in Law); the other is that the government sets quantity and 
the market determines the price (such as MMS we are discussing).  
 
In this study, we suggest implementing MMS policy in the modeled power market but not 
Feed-in Law or the same kind of policies for following reasons:  
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Firstly, in general, markets are more efficient than governments in setting prices. Learning 
from some countries’ experience, we know it is difficult to readjust prices downward once 
the relative higher price is set by the government (Lewis, J. & Wiser, R., 2005). Secondly, 
the allocation of price difference is a difficulty. According to the current status for Chinese 
power market, after the separation of generation and transmission, the profits gained by 
grid companies are not high enough to afford this price difference. On the other hand, 
China is still a developing country, and people’s living standard in China is still lower than 
that in developed countries. If the government mandates that wind power electricity has to 
be bought at a certain price which is generally higher than the regular market price for 
conventional power, it is hardly possible for people to voluntarily choose to pay an extra 
rate for the green electricity. An extra rate actually implies an increasing cost of living 
burden which ordinary people may not be able to afford. Last but not least, the legal 
system of the Chinese power industry is not strong and mature enough. In the market with 
an imperfect legal system, if there are two different prices existing, it will provide some 
conventional power producers with a loophole to strive for private benefits though 
deception. For instance, the coal-fired power producer may pretend itself to be a wind 
power producer to get round the laws or regulations and to make profit by selling 
coal-fired’s electricity at wind’s price. These possibilities must deviate from the original 
intention of the policies and impair the healthy development of wind power.  
 
6.2 Recommendations for Inner Mongolia 
We now take Inner Mongolian power market as an example to make some policy 
suggestions. We choose Inner Mongolia because it is reasonable to say that the modeled 
market can simply represent Inner Mongolian power market where the wind power and 
coal-fired power are simultaneously produced.  
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6.2.1 Some facts in Inner Mongolia 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region is one of the earliest provinces or regions to develop 
wind power and it offers the biggest development potential for wind power in China. It 
possesses a considerable wind resource. Its total reserve is up to 1,010 GW, containing 1/3 
of national wind resources, and the exploitable capacity is more than 100 GW (ICOSEPRI, 
2006). Its wind resource has the properties of stability and continuity. The areas in rich 
wind resource are stretching from northwest to northeast, accounting for 80 percent of the 
whole autonomous region. The average yearly wind speed in these areas is 3-4 meters per 
second. Its yearly available hours with effective wind speed can be 5,000 hours, and it 
even could be more than 7,000 hours in some area. Meanwhile, the longest yearly 
continuous hours with non-effective wind speed is less than 100 hours (ICOSEPRI, 2006). 
By the end of 2005, Inner Mongolia has already had 6 large-size wind plants with the total 
installed capacity of 16,574 MW, which is ranked second in China (Shi, 2006).  
 
Additionally, Inner Mongolia is the second-large coal base in China, just behind Shanxi 
province. It not only has an abundant coal resource with the total reserve of 10 gigatons 
(GT), but also has a relatively low cost for exploitation (Li, 2005, September 28). 
According to sources of local government, Inner Mongolia aims to be the country’s largest 
coal producer by 2010 (Li, 2005, September 28). 
 
Last but not least, being a pioneer province for developing wind power, the market for 
wind power is relatively matured in this region. Inner Mongolia has applied a 
government-direct pricing policy for a long time. It issued the regulation in 1995 to set the 
purchasing price for wind power at 0.731 Yuan / kwh (including VAT); 0.609 Yuan / kwh 
(excluding VAT). To support the development of wind power, Inner Mongolia government 
made great efforts. Subsidies are often provided by Chinese government to support 
renewable energy. In 1986-1990, Inner Mongolia government provided consumers with a 
subsidy of 200 Yuan per set of 100 Watts wind power system. Besides subsidies, it also 
arranged 400 million Yuan favorable loans to support its wind power and reduce the 
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value-added annex tax (VAAT) from 8% to 3% (NREL, 1999). However, it has not yet 
developed a sizable market for wind power, though efforts are under way to achieve this 
goal. 
 
6.2.2 Recommendations 
According to the 10th Five Year Plan, the wind development target for Inner Mongolia is 
300 MW by the end of 2010 (the World Bank, 2001). Although we can not provide 
specific details on how much the mandated target should be set each year due to the 
limitation of this study, we could make the following suggestions on implementation of 
such MMS policy in Inner Mongolia. 
 
Note that Inner Mongolia is still in the earlier stage to develop wind power. Considering 
it’s current market conditions, it should firstly establish a minimum amount of generation 
to be supplied from wind power through comprehensive legislation. The legislation should 
detail, for example, reasonable level wind power capacity during a certain period, the 
governmental subsidies for electricity supplied from wind power or fees for electricity 
from coal-fired power. This is tried and true measured in many countries.  
 
Additionally, many developed countries have spent a lot in research and development (R 
& D) of wind power technologies. China is behind these countries. In China, local 
governments rarely carry out R & D activities, almost all those activities are supported by 
central government. In order to promote sustainable wind power development, therefore, 
we suggest that wind power R & D should be listed as part of wind power projects. 
Although Inner Mongolia maybe has no advantage in manufacturing turbines, it can do 
other R & D activities such as: market analysis, policy studies and economic feasibility 
studies.  
 
Moreover, it is noticed that financial and tax incentives are good instruments to manage 
and regulate energy structure. One option, for instance, is to remove subsidies for coal. 
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Usually, these incentive measures are established and directed by central government. 
Local governments have little space to adjust them. For local government, therefore, it 
becomes more important to provide the central government with reliable data, and urge it 
to use the policy instruments moderately. We would like to suggest some incentive policy 
options to support MMS. 1) Extend the exemption period of income tax for wind power 
technologies, for example, to five years; 2) Reduce the existing VAT (8%) imposed on 
wind power at least equal to the coal-fired’s. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Summary 
In China, coal has been supported and subsidized for decades. As a result, coal-fired power 
plants are relatively inexpensive to build and fuel. Wind power, on the other hand, is still 
considered expensive compared to the competition (Lew, D. & Logan, J., 2001). Recalling 
the analyses in Section 4.1, and in Case II, IV, VI and VIII in Section 4.2, we conclude 
that if the market price were greater or equal to the wind power’s marginal cost at the 
optimal allocation point, the optimal allocation would be the same no matter MMS policy 
would be introduced or not. However, the condition that market price is greater or equal to 
the wind power’s marginal cost at the optimal allocation point is hardly satisfied by the 
current market except for CDM projects. In other words, if wind power industry could 
develop in a certain large-scale with a low enough marginal cost curve so that the market 
price can be equal to or even higher than its marginal cost at the optimal allocation point, 
MMS policy would be redundant.  
 
Additionally, based on the analyses in Case I, III, V and VII in Chapter 4 we conclude that 
under the current market condition that the marginal cost of wind power may be higher 
than the market price at the optimal allocation point, we need MMS policy to make a 
positive wind power output possible. Of course, this does not mean that a positive wind 
power target must be realized without any supporting measures. The supporting measures 
are necessarily needed to assist in implementing MMS. These supporting policies could be 
the direct governmental subsidies for this green power, and other fiscal instruments like 
Value Added Tax (VAT) reduction and technology development support, etc.  
 
According to the analyses in Chapter 5, we conclude: firstly, if the overall demand curve, 
the marginal cost curves, the upper generation capacity curves, and the mandated target 
faced by the producers in competitive case are the same as those in the social optimization 
problem, the competitive market will sustain the social solutions; additionally, if the 
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electricity outputs consumed in monopolistic case are the same as that consumed in 
competitive case, the market price chosen by the monopolist must be higher than the price 
set by competitive market. That is the competitive structure with MMS is more efficient 
than the monopolistic one.  
 
7.2 Limitation and suggestions for further studies 
Limitations in this study arise mainly from the capacity of a master thesis and the 
collection of necessary data. The scale for a master thesis is limited, not only in terms of 
the time span, but also of the issue chosen and included for discussion. This is very much 
what it has been faced with when this study was being done. Admittedly, there are a wide 
variety of important issues which are covered by the topic of wind power; however, it is 
highly impossible to cover all of them within one thesis. Therefore, the MMS policy 
regime on promoting wind power was selected as the focus of this study. For lack of the 
relevant power costs data, the model in this study is theory-based one. We may further 
investigate to set the target of an MMS by using cost- benefit analysis if the necessary data 
can successfully be collected. However, taking account of the similar properties among 
wind power and other renewable flow resources, the model in this study, may also applied 
to investigating these resources, such as solar, wave and geothermal power.   
 
There are, of course, some improvements or other aspects in the economic analysis of 
MMS policy that would be interesting for further discussion. The followings are some 
examples: 
 
Firstly, in my study, to simplify the problems we temporarily take the damage from using 
coal-fired power, )( coaled , as zero. An improvement study can be done to analyses the 
problems by considering the external cost  
 
Secondly, we said the supporting measures are necessary for implementing MMS policy. 
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For further study, we would investigate what the supporting measures could be on earth? 
And what are the advantages and disadvantages for these would-be supporting measures?  
 
Last but not least, in my study, we investigated the market where only wind power and 
coal-fired power are used simultaneously. However, a study adding other energy resource, 
such as hydro power, can be done to investigate how the MMS functions in that more 
complicated model. 
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